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THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN CONTEXT:
HOW CONTRACT TERMS DO (AND DO
NOT) DEFINE THE PROCESS
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIERt
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following arbitration clause, which might be found
in a contract of employment or a standard-form consumer contract:
Any claim, controversy, or dispute of any kind between us
will be resolved by binding arbitration, to be conducted in
Philadelphia, PA under the then-applicable rules of American
Arbitration Association or JAMS. The arbitrator may not
award punitive or exemplary damages.
Arbitration clauses like these have engendered a significant
amount of debate, much of which focuses on the proper response the
law should make to "one-sided" clauses - i.e., those that limit the pro-
cedures and remedies available to individuals in arbitration.1 Because
my example clause appears to prohibit awards of punitive damages
and to require significant travel for individuals who live far from Phil-
adelphia, it might fairly be termed "one-sided."
But the clause may not be as one-sided as it seems. In fact, the
drafter of this "one-sided" clause may have anticipated that it would
yield, in at least some disputes, a more "even-handed" process in
which punitive damages are available and arbitration hearings take
place in a location convenient for the individual disputant. Con-
versely, drafters of apparently "even-handed" clauses may sometimes
expect them to yield a "one-sided" disputing process.
t Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For helpful
comments and discussion on prior drafts, thanks to Scott Baker, Jill Family, Adam
Feibelman, Melissa Jacoby, and Richard Myers. Any mistakes are my own.
1. The debate over whether to enforce such clauses raises fundamental questions
about the proper regulation of markets. E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword: "Boiler-
plate". Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821, 821 (2006).
For a variety of views on the efficiency of consumer and employment arbitration con-
tracts, see Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to
Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 250-54
(2000); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695,
751-65; Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 91-93; and Jean R. Sternlight & Eliza-
beth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Busi-
ness Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004,
at 75, 92-95.
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This Essay explores these possibilities. It begins by asking an ap-
parently simple, but foundational question: Why would the business
produce a contract like this one? Part I explores the potentially com-
plex interaction between the "one-sided" terms in my example clause -
the punitive damages bar and the centralized hearing location - and
the "due process" protocols adopted by many arbitration service prov-
iders. As I will explain, although my example clause appears straight-
forward, it may be complex in operation. In particular, the clause
incorporates rules that may constrain the business's apparent prefer-
ence to avoid punitive damages and to conduct hearings in a central-
ized location.
By and large, the business could structure the arbitration process
however it wanted. 2 So what explains its decision to include these con-
flicting provisions in the clause? Part I briefly suggests a number of
possibilities before identifying and exploring an alternative. I argue
that the clause as written creates post-dispute strategic opportunities
for both parties and that these opportunities may shape the arbitra-
tion in significant ways. Part I suggests that the business grants these
opportunities to the individuals with whom it contracts as the "price"
for the legitimacy conferred by the due process protocols. In some
cases, the result may be an arbitration process that is less "one-sided"
than the clause itself would suggest. The protocols, however, do not
render "one-sided" terms meaningless or ineffective; the business
sometimes may exploit such terms to its advantage. Indeed, we might
view the one-sided terms as options that the business may or may not
exercise in the context of a particular dispute.
If the selection of a particular provider or set of rules may some-
times render apparently one-sided arbitration clauses more even-
handed than they seem, the opposite dynamic may also exist. Part II
explains how explicit provider rules and evolved practices among arbi-
trators may, in effect, supply "one-sided" terms that cannot be de-
tected from a review of the arbitration clause itself.
Together, Parts I and II yield two related and important insights.
First, arbitration clauses may paint an incomplete or even misleading
picture of actual arbitration procedures and remedies. Second, under-
standing arbitration as a legal, social, and contracting phenomenon
may require sustained inquiry into the relationship between arbitra-
tion contracts and the rules and practices of arbitrators and arbitra-
tion providers.
2. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989).
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I. WHAT PRICE LEGITIMACY?
The following sections examine the potential dynamic created by
the inclusion of apparently one-sided terms in a contract governed by
arbitration due process rules. I do not purport to offer a systematic
description of the actual operation of these rules on the ground. That
is an empirical question, and we do not have enough information to
offer meaningful answers. Instead, my goal is to generate hypotheses
worthy of further exploration. Nevertheless, the following discussion
draws in part on informal conversations with a variety of repeat play-
ers in the arbitration process, including lawyers, arbitrators, and arbi-
tration provider employees and executives.
A. AGREEMENTS THAT INCORPORATE, YET VIOLATE, THE DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOLS
As an example of this potential dynamic, return to my example
arbitration clause (reproduced below) and its one-sided terms: the lim-
itation on remedies and the centralized hearing location. For simplic-
ity, I will assume that this clause is contained in an employment
contract and that at least some employees live a significant distance
from Philadelphia:
Any claim, controversy, or dispute of any kind between us
will be resolved by binding arbitration, to be conducted in
Philadelphia, PA under the then-applicable rules of American
Arbitration Association or JAMS. The arbitrator may not
award punitive or exemplary damages.
Depending on one's beliefs about arbitration and the civil justice
system, this clause might seem an objectionable attempt to self-der-
egulate - by channeling disputes into a forum that denies employees
any meaningful remedy - or an attempt to rationalize a flawed process
of resolving employment disputes.3 But however we view it, the clause
seems straightforward. It appears to reveal clear employer prefer-
ences for (i) arbitration (ii) in a centralized hearing location (iii) with-
out the prospect of punitive damages. Beyond that, the employer may
3. For a variety of perspectives, compare Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation,
the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259 (2002) (viewing arbitration
as an opportunity for self-deregulation), with Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bar-
gain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negoti-
ation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 893-95 (2006)
(arguing that courts can control opportunistic contracting behavior and that arbitration
creates incentives for cooperative bargaining between firms and their customers and
employees), and David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the
Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1557, 1579-80 (2005) (arguing that many employers implement arbitration programs to
avoid inefficiencies associated with disputes, and to increase morale and reduce em-
ployee turnover).
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have no interest in specifying the minutiae of the arbitration process,
so it incorporates off-the-rack procedures promulgated by its chosen
arbitration providers.
4
Yet the clause is actually quite puzzling. A number of arbitration
providers, including AAA and JAMS, have adopted "due process" pro-
tocols designed to ensure minimally fair procedures in consumer and
employment disputes.5 As I will explain, the protocols purport to
screen out contract terms that are incompatible with providers' views
of basic adjudicatory fairness. Providers claim to refuse their services
when the arbitration clause contains terms that conflict with the gov-
erning protocol. 6 In my example clause, the punitive damages bar and
centralized hearing location appear to violate one or both sets of pro-
vider rules implementing these protocols.
7
What might explain the decision to include both the one-sided
terms and the (conflicting) provider rules? A party might agree to on-
erous terms in order to signal its commitment to a transaction.8 Per-
haps employees signal something of value to the employer
4. E.g., Bodie, 39 GA. L. REV. at 30.
5. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIo ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 369, 401-04 (2004); AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 [hereinafter CON-
SUMER PROTOCOL]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
(1995), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT PRO-
TOCOL]; JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE
CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2007), available at http:/!
www.jamsadr.com/rules/consumer-min-std.asp [hereinafter JAMS CONSUMER POLICY];
JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDU-
RAL FAIRNESS (2005), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/employmentArbitra-
tion-min-stds.asp [hereinafter JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY]. The NAF has similar rules,
NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, CONSUMER AND EMPLOYEE ARBITRATION RIGHTS (2006),
available at http://www.arb-forum.com (follow "Rules & Forms" hyperlink), although
they differ in some respects and are viewed as inadequate by many consumer lawyers
and advocates.
6. Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. at 403-04, 407. I do not mean to sug-
gest that this "claim" is false. To the contrary, I suspect that many providers diligently
seek to enforce their due process rules. But we presently have little more than provid-
ers' assurances as to the actual operation of the protocols.
7. With respect to punitive damages, see CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 5,
Principle 14; EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 5, 5; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N,
RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 14 (2006), available at http:ll
www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4426; JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 5, [ 3; JAMS EM-
PLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, Standard No. 1. See also Affidavit of Neil B. Currie on
Behalf of the American Arbitration Association in Response and Objection to a Sub-
poena for Documents Issued by Plaintiff, Ragan v. AT&T Corp., No. 02-L-168 (Ill. Cir.
Ct., 3d Dist., July 15, 2002) (on file with author). With respect to hearing location, see
JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, Standard No. 6.
8. For example, a party might agree to pay substantial liquidated damages to sig-
nal its low probability of breach. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
129 (4th ed. 1992); Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Gov-
ernance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 276 (1984); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
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(nonlitigiousness?) by signing my example contract. But this seems
implausible; it may be that few employees are even aware of the
clause. Of course, the signaling might run in the other direction. The
inclusion of one-sided terms might be a communication from the busi-
ness to plaintiffs' lawyers, signaling that disputes under the agree-
ment will be expensive to litigate or will yield a lower payout. 9 But
then why weaken that signal by selecting a provider with conflicting
rules?
Another possibility is that the company knows that JAMS and
AAA often do not enforce their rules. This cannot be ruled out, in part
because providers are reluctant to provide the data needed to evaluate
this possibility. There have been allegations that actual practices
sometimes conflict with providers' public stances. 10 Providers, how-
ever, are under no small amount of scrutiny, and I am not aware of
supported allegations of under- or non-enforcement of these providers'
due process rules. 1
Perhaps the employer intends to waive the one-sided terms if
challenged and includes them primarily for their potential in terrorem
effect: the clause may deter employees from bringing claims. 12 This is
indeed a possible explanation, but it seems at least incomplete. Even
after a dispute arises, many employees will be unaware of the terms,
and it seems implausible to suggest that many of those who know
about the terms will refrain from filing a claim, or contacting a lawyer,
because of them. 13 Whether the terms would deter many lawyers is an
open question.
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 578-80 (1977).
9. Whether the dispute indeed would be more expensive to litigate depends in
part on how effectively the due process rules induce businesses to waive these terms in
arbitration. See infra pp. 666-71.
10. E.g., Paul Bland, CL&P Blog, AAA Breaks its Promise Not to Hear Pre-Dispute
Arbitrations in Health Care Cases (Feb. 22, 2007), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/
2007/02/aaabreaks its_.html.
11. Cf Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 58, 58-60 (noting link between a threatened boycott of ADR providers by
the National Employment Lawyers Association and the adoption of the due process
protocols).
12. E.g., William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System:
A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 828 (1993); Bailey
Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 845, 862 (1988); see also Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their
Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 272 (1970) (reporting results of sur-
vey of residential tenants, many of whom took for granted the validity of unenforceable
lease terms).
13. It may be that few parties contact a lawyer in the first place, although not
much is known about the frequency with which aggrieved parties make claims against
perceived wrongdoers, contact attorneys, or file lawsuits. For some exceptions, see Her-
bert M. Kritzer, W.A. Bogart & Neil Vidmar, The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors
659
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Inadvertence might also explain the inclusion of these conflicting
terms. The lawyers for the business may not have known about the
AAA and JAMS rules. My example arbitration agreement, however,
likely governs many employees, and a lawyer drafting such an agree-
ment would surely become familiar with the designated providers'
rules. A related possibility is that arbitration contracts are "sticky."
An employer is unlikely to change its contracting practices unless it
perceives a flaw, and even then there are costs involved in changing
contract terms.14 Maybe there have been no disputes under the agree-
ment, so the employer has not identified the conflict with provider
rules, or perhaps it has identified the conflict but does not wish to
incur the cost of making a change. I suspect, however, that this expla-
nation will not apply to all such contracts. Large employers in particu-
lar may have significant experience with arbitration, and both AAA
and JAMS publicize their due process rules fairly heavily.
15
To varying degrees, some or all of these explanations may be valid
in different contracting contexts. But there is another explanation,
one that highlights the complex interplay between arbitration provid-
ers and arbitration clauses. As I will explain, the choice of provider is
a deliberate and consequential one, with potentially significant,
though hard to observe, implications for the meaning and function of
the arbitration clause. To understand this interplay, we should first
consider the diverse "products" offered by arbitration service
providers.
B. THE LEGITIMACY FUNCTION OF THE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS
My example arbitration clause is not atypical. Many and perhaps
most consumer and employment arbitrations are conducted under the
in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the United States, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 499
(1991); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
85-87 (1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: As-
sessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525, 537 & Table 2 (1980). 1 know of
no evidence suggesting that onerous contract terms deter those who would otherwise
contact an attorney from doing so, although there is some evidence to suggest that con-
sumers and others may take for granted the legality of unenforceable terms. E.g., Muel-
ler, 69 MICH. L. REV. at 272.
14. Pierre Azoulay & Shane Scott, Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and the Failure of
Young Firms, 47 MGMT. Sci. 337, 340 (2001).
15. On the likelihood of the employer having experience with arbitration, see
Sherwyn et al., 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1586-87, and Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in
Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a New Survey of Employment Arbitration Pro-
grams, Disp. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 81-82. For examples of the public nature of
provider rules, see AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES, availa-
ble at http'//www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29149; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, ARBITRATING UNDER
THE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (RULES), AS
AMENDED AND EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2006, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=
29174; JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5.
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auspices of arbitration service providers like the AAA, JAMS, or the
NAF. 16 And it is not unheard of (and may even be common) for an
arbitration clause to incorporate provider rules that appear to conflict
with other contract terms. 17 What explains the choice of provider in a
contract? Without purporting to explain the full sweep of contracting
behavior, I suggest that providers offer a variety of arbitration-related
goods and services and bundle these in different ways. Thus, the
choice of provider is driven, at least in part, by the particular arbitra-
tion "product" the business wants to buy.
Arbitration providers sell a diverse range of goods and services,
including administration, "lawmaking," risk management, and legiti-
macy. Administrative services include identifying and training arbi-
trators, handling case logistics, and managing arbitration facilities.' 8
Providers also sell private "lawmaking," for example by generating de-
fault disputing procedures and by providing an institutional context in
which private legal norms can develop. 19 And providers sell risk man-
agement, such as insulation from some of the risk of class actions. 20
Most important for my purposes, providers may also sell legiti-
macy. Arbitration clauses are often challenged by parties who would
prefer to litigate their disputes in court,2 1 and the designation of a
recognized provider may help immunize the arbitration agreement
from challenge. 2 2
16. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Reso-
lution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 965
(2002).
17. For similar agreements in the consumer and employment context, see Sprint
Communications Co., L.P. Customer Agreement dated May 2002, (quoted in In re Uni-
versal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d. 1107, 1122-23 (D. Kan.
2003)), and Booker v. Robert HalfInt'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C. 2004), affd,
413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The actual agreement in Booker called for arbitration pur-
suant to the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. Id. But the AAA applies its employ-
ment rules anyway, at least when the arbitration is conducted pursuant to an employer-
promulgated plan. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDI-
ATION PROCEDURES, Rule 1 (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
18. See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REv. 39, 52-53 (1999).
19. Id.; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 747 (1999).
20. On the risk management function of arbitration generally, see Scott Baker, A
Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 874-81 (2004).
21. E.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 337 F.3d 697, 704-06 (6th Cir. 2003), amended
by 355 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2005); Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 49 P.3d 647, 650-
51 (Nev. 2002); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
22. See, e.g., Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1318 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) ("The rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . are generally re-
garded to be neutral and fair."); Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL
2452851, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2004) (rejecting challenge to confidentiality require-
ment under AAA rules: "The AAA is a reputable arbitration body and the reasons for
2007]
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One way a provider can confer legitimacy is to publicly adopt and
enforce due process or "fairness" rules. 23 As I have mentioned, the due
process protocols purport to screen out terms that providers view as
incompatible with a fair disputing process. These are not default rules
to fill gaps in incomplete contracts; 24 they are mandatory. When a de-
mand for arbitration is filed, the stated policy of both AAA and JAMS
is to review the applicable clause for compliance with the governing
rules and to bring clauses with non-compliant terms to the parties'
attention.2 5 The business may waive any non-compliant term, and if it
does not, the claimant may waive any objection to the term.26 In ei-
ther case, the arbitration will go forward. Otherwise, the provider
should decline the case.
27
The provider's decision to decline the case does not necessarily
mean the dispute will be litigated in court. The business may ask a
court to compel arbitration, possibly before a provider who will enforce
its chosen terms. 28 In reply, the claimant will likely ask the court to
invalidate the arbitration clause altogether. As I explain below, in the
resulting dispute over the enforceability of the arbitration clause, the
provider's refusal to accept the case may increase the probability that
confidentiality are designed to protect all parties in a dispute"); Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting testimony that "reputable" providers
like AAA and JAMS would refuse to enforce the agreement challenged in that case); see
also Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. at 409-12 (noting guidance provided to
courts by due process protocols); Drahozal, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. at 752 (discussing value
of providers' reputational capital).
23. E.g., Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. at 426.
24. E.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
25. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION at 33-34 (2003), available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3652 [hereinafter FAIR PLAY]; JAMS CONSUMER POLICY,
supra note 5.
26. I understand that JAMS policy is to accept the dispute if the employee waives
objection to the offending term. I do not know whether AAA has a similar policy, al-
though I imagine that it does. It is not clear why a provider would prevent an employee
from agreeing, post-dispute, to arbitrate without the possibility of recovering punitive
damages.
27. See FAIR PLAY, supra note 25, at 34; JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5.
28. E.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 n.42 (3d Cir.
1997). For example, the business might argue as a matter of contract law that the con-
tract should be enforced insofar as possible - i.e., by compelling arbitration before a
provider who will enforce the punitive damages restriction and hearing locale. As for
objections to the punitive damages waiver itself, the business might argue that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements "according to
their terms" and preempts state law to the contrary. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Baz-
zle, 539 U.S. 444, 455-60 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). A similar argument could
be made about the choice of location. E.g., Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., Inc., 566 S.E.2d
730, 734 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). But see David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Strip-
ping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 49, 84-86 (2003) (arguing against this broad FAA preemption standard).
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the dispute will wind up in court.29 For now, it is enough to say that
governing "law" - in the sense of norms and rules articulated by public
actors like courts and legislatures - does not clearly establish the va-
lidity or non-validity of the one-sided terms, but that a conflict with a
provider's due process rules may increase the likelihood that the par-
ties' entire dispute will wind up in court.
Note that a provider's decision to market the legitimacy compo-
nent of its product may constrain it in other ways. For example, a pro-
vider who emphasizes risk management may need to depart from the
due process protocols - say, by agreeing to enforce the one-sided terms
in my example contract - and doing so may reduce its ability to confer
legitimacy. 30 (If these departures are difficult to detect, however, the
constraint may be minimal. I return to this possibility at the end of
this Essay.)3 1 Because arbitration may serve different functions for
different users,32 providers inhabit a segmented market, tailoring
their offerings to accommodate different customer groups. Thus, the
choice of provider is a deliberate one, and the designated provider is
often an integral part of the arbitration clause.
C. THE POST-DISPUTE STRATEGIC VALUE OF CONTRACT TERMS AND
DUE PROCESS RULES
The preceding discussion suggests another explanation why the
employer in my example contract would incorporate rules that seem to
conflict with other terms in the contract. The employer clearly prefers
arbitration to litigation. Ideally, it wants to arbitrate before one of the
providers designated in the clause.3 3 As I have explained, different
providers offer different arbitration products, and both AAA and
JAMS arguably confer more legitimacy than other providers.
3 4 It
seems safe to assume that my hypothetical employer deliberately
sought this legitimacy; after all, it could have designated a provider
29. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
30. To a degree, the provider may free ride on (and ultimately weaken) the efforts
of other providers to build legitimacy. E.g., Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. at
425-26. But its failure to convince lawyers, advocates, and courts of the fairness of its
procedures may also attract scrutiny. E.g., Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
671, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
31. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
32. E.g., Sherwyn et al., 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1581 (arguing that many employers
implement arbitration programs to "avoid inefficiencies created by disputes, increase
morale, and reduce turnover"; possibly, these concerns might affect the choice of pro-
vider, as well as choice of which procedures and remedies to make available in
arbitration).
33. E.g., In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554,
557-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that choice of arbitral forum may be integral to the
arbitration agreement).
34. See supra notes 5, 15, & 22.
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that would enforce its chosen terms, including the one-sided terms.3 5
Yet it did not do so.
Why then did the employer include the one-sided terms in its
agreement? The answer is that these terms still serve an important
function. In effect, the contract bestows on the employer an option to
insist on enforcing the one-sided terms in particular disputes. The
price of exercising this option is a modest but non-trivial increase in
the likelihood that a court will invalidate the entire arbitration clause
and allow the dispute to be litigated in court. Significantly, the em-
ployer decides whether to exercise the option post-dispute, after it has
investigated the merits of the employee's claim.
The following discussion examines the post-dispute dynamic cre-
ated by the filing of an arbitration demand. For simplicity, I focus on
the interaction between the due process rules and the punitive dam-
ages bar, leaving to one side the term requiring all hearings to occur in
a centralized location. As I will explain, this dynamic may shape the
arbitration process, sometimes in ways that appear to conflict with the
arbitration clause itself.
1. Disputes posing low risk of punitive damages
Consider a hypothetical dispute in which an employee bound by
my example agreement, represented by an attorney, files a demand
for arbitration with JAMS. If the process works as stated, JAMS will
identify the conflict between the punitive damages bar and its mini-
mum standards and will ask the employer to waive the non-compliant
term.3 6 Before responding, the employer's lawyers will presumably in-
vestigate the claim to assess whether the dispute poses a material risk
of a punitive damages award. For now, assume that the employer as-
sesses this risk as low.
Under these circumstances, it seems plausible to assume that the
dispute will proceed to arbitration. Either the employer will waive the
punitive damages bar, or the employee's lawyer will waive any objec-
tion. Indeed, given the presumed benefits of arbitration, the employer
may routinely waive the term in cases where it perceives little or no
risk of punitive damages. Of course, if the employer is wrong in its
assessment of this risk, its waiver - induced by the due process rules -
benefits the employee.
Alternatively, the employer might refuse to waive the punitive
damages bar, perhaps to avoid setting an informal "precedent" that
35. E.g., Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. at 421-22; Carrington, 3 NEV.
L.J. at 284-85.
36. JAMS Employment Policy, supra note 5, Standard No. 1; Reuben, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 59.
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might create pressure to waive the term in future cases. If the em-
ployee's lawyer wants to seek punitive damages, or has other reasons
for wanting to challenge the arbitration agreement, the lawyer may
object to the term and JAMS should reject the case. 3 7 Although the
consequences of that rejection are not clear, the employer's refusal to
waive the offending term may increase the probability of a successful
challenge to the arbitration agreement. 38 That is another potential
benefit to claimants of the due process protocols.
Of course, the employee's lawyer also may waive any objection to
the punitive damages bar, and the dispute will proceed to arbitration.
This decision might reflect the lawyer's assessment that the benefits
of arbitration outweigh any incremental strategic advantage gained
by asserting a claim for punitive damages or simply an assessment
that the cost of challenging the arbitration clause outweighs the po-
tential benefits of a jury trial. Either way, it is worth noting that this
decision - unlike the employee's initial commitment to arbitrate - oc-
curs post-dispute and on the advice of the employee's lawyer. Objec-
tions premised on the employer's superior knowledge and bargaining
power may have less force in this context.
3 9
Two points should be clear from this discussion. First, in my ex-
ample contract, the due process protocols may produce "waivers," by
one side or the other, in a significant number of cases.40 This will be
37. JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5. Other reasons for challenging the
arbitration agreement might include situations where the lawyer represents a number
of employees bound by this (or similar) agreements and stands to benefit from a court
ruling invalidating the clause. Of course, the lawyer might institute such a challenge
without first filing an arbitration demand, but the provider's rejection of the dispute
may strengthen the challenge. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
39. Cf Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alterna-
tive) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 620 (noting potential benefits of
superior knowledge of arbitration process to employer, both in contracting and in arbi-
tration itself). Whether "repeat-players" fare better in arbitration is a matter of some
dispute (see, for example, Sherwyn et al., 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1571-72), and I do not
know of any evidence comparing the magnitude of any such effect to that found before
courts. It is possible that plaintiffs' lawyers can moderate any repeat-player effect. E.g.,
Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1355 (1997). Some providers have taken steps to increase arbi-
tration transparency and expand access to information about arbitration awards, and
these efforts may also moderate any repeat-player effect. For example, the AAA has
begun making its arbitration awards available to the public and on its website. AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES,
Rule 39(b) (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28481#39 [hereinafter EM-
PLOYMENT RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE AWARDS ONLINE,
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29632.
40. I use "waiver" to refer to the intentional relinquishment of a right, whether the
employer's right to insist on enforcement of a term that conflicts with the due process
protocols or the claimant's right to object to the term. E.g., Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel
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true especially where the business perceives a low risk of punitive
damages. Indeed, I have had a number of informal discussions in
which arbitration provider employees and executives have asserted
that waivers - by both sides - are quite common. Second, frequent
waivers may reflect nothing more than the rarity of disputes in which
the underlying conduct would support (or an arbitrator would award)
punitive damages. 4 1 In cases where the employer correctly perceives a
low risk of punitive damages, we can further conclude that the puni-
tive damages bar and the choice of provider rules will rarely have a
significant impact on the parties' substantive rights or strategic
options.
But this will not always be true. In at least some cases, the em-
ployer may incorrectly assess its risk and waive the punitive damages
bar. When this happens, the due process protocols produce a benefit to
the employee. In the process, they also produce an arbitration in
which remedies apparently forbidden by the contract are in fact avail-
able. Moreover, as I discuss below, waivers (by both sides) may occur
even when the employer perceives a legitimate risk of punitive
damages.
2. Disputes posing a risk of punitive damages
Now consider a hypothetical dispute, again involving an employee
bound by my example contract and represented by an attorney, in
which the employer's investigation uncovers conduct that might sup-
port an award of punitive damages. How might the punitive damages
bar and the due process protocols interact in disputes like these?
There are a number of possibilities.
First, waiver may be relatively common even when punitive dam-
ages are at stake. The protocols may force the employer to choose be-
tween the certainty of arbitration before an arbitrator empowered to
award punitive damages and the (unknown) probability of litigation
before a similarly-empowered jury. In some cases, the employer may
choose arbitration. By hypothesis, however, the employer will also
have superior information about the likelihood of punitive damages,
J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 213 n.3 (2006).
41. In what may be a familiar refrain, I note here that there is little evidence of
actual arbitrator practices in awarding punitive damages. For some limited exceptions,
see Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 317 n.l (2003)
(referring to unpublished empirical evidence finding little difference between arbitra-
tors and juries in awarding punitive damages); Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to
Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 583, 586 n.22
(1995) (referring to limited evidence of punitive damage awards in securities
arbitration).
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and in some cases it may exploit this advantage to procure a waiver by
the employee's lawyer.
Second, the employer's refusal to waive the punitive damages bar
may increase the probability of a successful challenge to the entire
arbitration clause. 42 (This makes relying on a waiver by the em-
ployee's lawyer a risky strategy for the employer.) But the employee
might trade the right to make such a challenge, and potentially to
seek punitive damages before a jury, for other concessions in the arbi-
tration. In this sense, the due process protocols may provoke a secon-
dary negotiation over the terms of the arbitration. And unlike the
"negotiation" that produced the arbitration agreement, this negotia-
tion would be conducted post-dispute, often by lawyers, and in the
shadow of legal doctrine that, from the employee's perspective, is rela-
tively favorable.
43
a. Reasons for waiver by the business
In my hypothetical dispute, the employer might agree to waive
the punitive damages bar even though it perceives a risk of punitive
damages. Without attempting to model this decision, let me suggest
that in some cases the employer will still expect the dispute to cost it
less in arbitration, even if the arbitrator has the certain authority to
award punitive damages. I assume here that arbitrators tend to issue
lower awards than juries, and that this holds true for punitive dam-
ages awards as well.4 4 And I make the standard assumption that di-
rect costs of disputing - lawyer fees, discovery costs, and the like - are
lower in arbitration. 45
42. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
43. I do not claim that the law guarantees the employee success; far from it. Most
of modern arbitration law aims to ensure that arbitration agreements are "enforced ac-
cording to their terms." Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). My point is only that the employer's refusal to waive
the punitive damages bar and the provider's subsequent rejection of the dispute
strengthen the employee's hand in a dispute over the enforceability of the contract. See
infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
44. For evidence that awards may be lower in arbitration than in litigation, see, for
example, Lisa B. Bingham, Focus on Arbitration After Gilmer: Employment Arbitration:
The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 199-200 (1997); Sherwyn et
al., 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1576.
45. E.g., Sherwyn et al., 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1572-73 (noting lower disposition time
of arbitration); Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration
at Gilmer's Quinceanera, 81 TUL. L. REv. 331, 346-47 (2006) (summarizing mixed evi-
dence on employer cost savings). Professor Bales rightly notes that an employer's imple-
mentation of an arbitration program might actually increase costs - especially given
start-up costs associated with the creation of the program and the potential for in-
creased claiming rates. I make here only the relatively uncontroversial assumption
that, once a dispute has arisen, direct costs of dispute resolution will tend to be lower in
arbitration.
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By contrast, if the business refuses to waive the punitive damages
bar, it faces not only the potential cost of defending against a chal-
lenge to the arbitration clause, but, if it loses that fight, the additional
cost of litigation before a jury. Here, I define the cost of litigation
broadly to include, say, the cost of a precedential ruling affecting the
employer's relationships with all of its employees. 46 Depending on its
beliefs about the vagaries of the jury system, the employer might pre-
fer the certain prospect of an arbitration in which punitive damages
are available to the unknown probability of a jury trial that might re-
sult in a much higher award.
4 7
If the employer refuses to waive the term, the employee too has an
option: waive objection to the punitive damages bar or assert the ob-
jection and cause the provider to reject the case. In the latter case, the
employee is not necessarily free to litigate the dispute in court. The
employee could, however, file a lawsuit and, if the employer seeks to
compel arbitration, challenge the enforceability of the arbitration
clause. And here, the provider's rejection of the dispute may
strengthen the employee's hand.
One possibility is that the rejection may influence the court to in-
validate the punitive damages bar and perhaps the arbitration clause
itself. To determine the validity of the punitive damages bar, the court
will look to relevant federal or state law, often state-law unconsciona-
bility doctrine. 48 In theory, the provider's refusal to accept the case
should be irrelevant to this inquiry; providers may disapprove of le-
gally enforceable terms if they choose.4 9 In practice, however, the pro-
vider's rejection of the dispute, and its determination that the clause
violates the due process protocol, might heighten the court's suspi-
46. For example, a decision invalidating the arbitration clause or declaring a par-
ticular employment practice unlawful would of course impose substantial costs. For a
similar point in the context of consumer transactions, see Johnston, 104 MICH. L. REV.
at 895. In my view, there is reason to believe that, in at least some contexts, consumer
and employment arbitration can create "precedent" in a similar manner. W. Mark C.
Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARiz. L. REV. 69, 103-06
(2007).
47. Rightly or wrongly, the employer might expect the magnitude (if not the likeli-
hood) of a punitive damages award to be much greater before a jury. E.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoher-
ence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1245
(2002) (noting deeply ingrained public assumptions about "outrageous" punitive dam-
ages); Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Eco-
nomic Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 237, 283 (suggesting that, at least in automobile
product liability cases, "company decisionmakers are likely to substantially overesti-
mate the frequency and magnitudes of punitive damages awards").
48. E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 765-66 (2004).
49. E.g., FAIR PLAY, supra note 25, at 34.
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cion. 50 If the court holds the punitive damages bar invalid, it will have
to decide whether to sever the term and compel arbitration or to inval-
idate the entire arbitration agreement, thus allowing the dispute to
proceed in court.5 1 Typically, when the challenge to the arbitration
agreement occurs before the dispute reaches the arbitration provider,
severance might be the likelier result.5 2 But here, the court may be
less inclined towards severance. After all, the employer has already
declined precisely this result by refusing to waive the punitive dam-
ages bar when asked by the provider.
What if governing law permits the punitive damages bar?5 3 Pre-
sumably, the court cannot compel arbitration before the providers
specified in the contract. If we are to take provider rules and public
statements seriously, neither should accept the case. 54 To be sure, the
court might resolve this dilemma by compelling arbitration before an
arbitrator who will enforce the contract as written.5 5 But it might also
refuse to compel arbitration, interpreting the contract to designate the
AAA and JAMS as the exclusive arbitration providers and concluding
that, because they will not accept the dispute, "there is no further
promise to arbitrate in another forum." 56 I do not necessarily advocate
this result. I make only the descriptive claim that courts sometimes
interpret as integral to the contract language selecting a particular
provider or set of arbitration rules. 57 If I am correct that the choice of
provider is a significant contracting decision, reflecting the specific ar-
bitration "product" desired by the business, these decisions are easily
understood. The provider's refusal to take the case thus offers an addi-
50. Cf Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. at 409-12 (noting that protocols
may influence judicial decisions about the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
51. E.g., Lacey v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 918 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (invalidating agreement).
52. Ex parte Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 2002); Gannon v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
53. For cases enforcing punitive damages waivers, or at least suggesting that such
terms alone will not render the agreement unenforceable, see New S. Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 650 (S.D. Miss. 2005); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No.
SACV 03-130 DOC., 2003 WL 21530185 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003); Kinnebrew v. Gulf
Ins. Co., CA No. 3:94-CV-1517-R, 1994 WL 803508, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994);
and Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163, 1168 n.7 (8th Cir.
1984).
54. E.g., FAIR PLAY, supra note 25, at 34 ("There may be circumstances where AAA
will not provide administration even if a provision may be legally enforceable, as the
standard followed by AAA may be higher than the law allows.").
55. Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 n.42 (3d Cir. 1997).
56. In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554, 557
(2d Cir. 1995); see also Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 674-75 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004).
57. See supra note 56.
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tional argument to claimants who wish to pursue their claims in
court.
58
As I have mentioned, I have heard anecdotally from provider em-
ployees that businesses and employers often waive terms that conflict
with the due process protocols. I know of no other evidence to support
this assertion, and of course the waivers might be confined to cases
where the offending term serves no function, such as disputes in
which the employer correctly perceives no risk of punitive damages.
But if the foregoing analysis is correct, at least some "meaningful"
waivers will also occur. If so, these are cases in which the due process
rules yield a clear benefit to individual claimants. They are also cases
where the contract paints a misleading picture of actual arbitration
remedies and procedures.
59
Indeed, I do not discount the possibility that, over time, the due
process rules may lead some businesses to remove noncompliant
terms from their agreements altogether. Some providers overtly seek
that goal, at least in their public statements about the protocols. 60
Whether or not this occurs with any frequency, the due process rules
merit further inquiry for their potential impact on individual disputes.
b. Reasons for waiver by the employee
To this point, I have suggested some reasons why the employer in
my hypothetical dispute might waive its right to seek enforcement of
the punitive damages bar even when it perceives a risk that punitive
58. E.g., Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 674-75; see also Smith Barney, Inc. v. Criti-
cal Health Sys., 212 F.3d 858, 861-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting the rule in different con-
text); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
that arbitration should be compelled unless choice of provider was an integral part of
the agreement to arbitrate).
59. This assumes, of course, that arbitrators actually do award punitive damages
in appropriate cases. They may not, which might resolve the apparent conflict between
the terms in my example contract. This is yet another unanswered empirical question
about arbitration. Providers rely on the protocols to give public assurances of fair proce-
dure. E.g., Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. at 371 (noting that adoption of
protocols may have helped ward off more direct regulation of arbitration providers); AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES, available at http://www.
adr.org/si.asp?id=4453 [hereinafter REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES] ("If you have a dis-
pute with a business .. .[t]he American Arbitration Association will only administer
your dispute if the arbitration clause meets certain fairness standards that are con-
tained in the AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol."); JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY,
supra note 5 (stating that JAMS will administer an arbitration only if the agreement
complies with its minimum standards). Without empirical study, it is hard to evaluate
these assurances.
60. E.g., REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES, supra note 59 ("If you do not revise your
arbitration agreement to comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, we will re-
turn the filing information to the consumer with instructions to pursue other remedies
and we will refuse to administer any other cases until your arbitration agreement is in
compliance.").
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damages might be awarded.6 1 But the punitive damages bar does
serve a function. By including it, the employer will probably avoid pu-
nitive damages in some cases. The protocols cannot prevent this, but
on occasion they might enable claimants to bargain for other conces-
sions in the arbitration.
One reason the protocols will not ensure that punitive damages
are available in all arbitrations is because the employer can force a
judicial decision on the term's validity by refusing to waive the term.
Previously, I argued that the employer's refusal may lessen its
chances of success, 6 2 but it remains possible that a court will compel
arbitration before an arbitrator who will enforce the contract as writ-
ten.63 More significantly, some or all providers may allow the em-
ployee to waive any objection to the punitive damages bar. Thus, the
employer may insist on the punitive damages bar and gamble that the
employee will waive objection.
Anecdotally, I understand that such waivers are relatively com-
mon. This should not be surprising. For one thing, the employee's law-
yer may view the additional cost of challenging the punitive damages
bar as prohibitive. In reasonably high-stakes disputes, the additional
cost of litigating the term's validity (a mostly legal issue) might not be
substantial.64 But in relatively small-stakes disputes, this explana-
tion might have some force.
6 5
Perhaps a more likely explanation is that the employer will some-
times have superior information about the risk of punitive damages.
For example, it will know whether similar claims have been made
against it in arbitration, or whether it has a track record of ignoring
complaints similar to that made by the employee. Because the pro-
vider's review of the arbitration agreement occurs at the beginning of
the case, the employee's lawyer may lack the information needed to
accurately assess the likelihood of punitive damages. 6 6 Thus, in some
61. The same analysis would apply to the term requiring significant travel to at-
tend the hearing. JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, Standard No. 6.
62. See supra notes 48-58.
63. E.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 n.42 (3d Cir.
1997).
64. In some cases, as when the plaintiffs lawyer has or expects to bring additional
cases against that employer, the benefits of a successful challenge may be significant.
65. Small-stakes disputes, of course, may not attract lawyers in the first place.
E.g., William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Re-
ally Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DiSP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40,
44 (reporting, based on survey of employment lawyers, that before accepting a case law-
yers required, on average, minimum provable damages of $60,000 to $65,000 and a re-
tainer of $3,000 to $3,600).
66. E.g., REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES, supra note 59; FAIR PLAY, supra note 25,
at 33-34. Of course, even if the review occurred later, the arbitrator might not permit
sufficient discovery to uncover the employer's history.
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cases the punitive damages bar may allow the employer to exploit its
informational advantage to procure relatively uninformed waivers.
67
In this sense, frequent waivers by claimants might be a sign of the
ineffectiveness of the protocols.
Yet not all such waivers will be uninformed. Returning to my ex-
ample contract, the employee's lawyer may know enough about the
employer, and learn enough from the employee, to make a reasonably
informed decision. And the stakes will be high enough in some dis-
putes to justify a challenge to the arbitration clause. 68 Given our lim-
ited knowledge of arbitration, it is impossible to say whether
individual claimants frequently waive objection to contracts that con-
flict with the protocols and, if so, why. No doubt there are uninformed
waivers as well as cases where the claimant's lawyer correctly per-
ceives a low probability of punitive damages or prefers arbitration to
litigation for other reasons.
A final point is worth making. I have explained that when the
provider rejects a dispute, the claimant may have a stronger case for
invalidating the arbitration agreement. 69 Thus, in my example, the
employer's refusal to waive the punitive damages bar may expose it to
an increased risk of a jury trial and possibly even punitive damages.
On occasion, an employee may barter away the right to make such a
challenge for some other concession in the arbitration - say, the em-
ployer's agreement to provide certain discovery, or its agreement to
67. This is not the only function served by the punitive damages bar in my example
contract. For example, the business or employer may not know whether the due process
rules will apply to every case. E.g., JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5 (noting
standards do not apply to individually-negotiated contracts of employment). Or it may
be aware of the prospect of class arbitration and wish to preserve the argument that the
protocols do not apply in such cases.
68. For limited evidence about claim sizes in consumer and employment arbitra-
tion, see CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004), available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print-
Aug_6.pdf. The report reviews consumer and employment arbitration data disclosed
pursuant to California law. Mean and median claim amounts, in the minority of cases
where this was reported, were $90,341 and $19,800, respectively. Id. at 20. (Presumably
claim amounts are higher than realistic expected recoveries.) The mean is skewed by
some particularly high claims - e.g., one for $6.5 million. Mean and median awards,
again reported in only a minority of cases, were $33,112 and $7,615, with at least one
outlier again distorting the mean. Id. These numbers are drawn from a vast range of
disputes involving consumers, employees, personal injury claimants, investors, and
others. Id. at 22. In employment cases, 61 of the 76 cases that reported the employee's
yearly wages listed wages as under $100,000. Id. at 23. As the report notes, poor data
reporting quality limits the conclusions that can be drawn from published provider
data. Id. at 26-32.
69. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN CONTEXT
pay an award without requiring the employee's lawyer to seek a court
order confirming the award.
70
In this sense, then, the due process protocols may provoke a sec-
ondary negotiation over the terms of the arbitration. Of course, the
parties are always free to engage in such negotiations, and their lever-
age will be a function, in part, of background legal rules. For example,
with or without the protocols, the employee can trade the right to chal-
lenge the agreement on unconscionability grounds for a more
favorable arbitration process. The protocols, however, may both alter
the background legal rules and effectively force a negotiation in cases
where noncompliant contract terms prevent the arbitration from go-
ing forward. Once again, if such negotiations occur, the resulting arbi-
tration may offer remedies and procedures that appear unavailable
from a review of the contract itself.
3. Summary
The preceding discussion has explored the apparent conflict be-
tween the one-sided terms of my example contract - the punitive dam-
ages bar and the centralized hearing location - and the designated
providers' rules. Although for simplicity I have focused on the punitive
damages waiver, both terms could be analyzed in similar fashion.
7 '
One explanation for the employer's decision to include both one-sided
terms and conflicting provider rules may be that it wants, insofar as
possible, to limit its disputing risk without foregoing the legitimacy
conferred by reputable arbitration providers. These preferences are in
tension, and the due process rules may require the employer to accept
some limits on its ability to structure the arbitration process as it
pleases.
7 2
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the one-sided terms
serve no function - that they are nullified by the due process rules.
The price of legitimacy is not so high. In effect, one-sided terms bestow
an option that the employer may choose to exercise, or not, after gath-
ering information about the employee's claim. If implemented consist-
ently, the due process protocols force the employer to make this choice
and also increase the cost of insisting on enforcing the one-sided
terms. This dynamic sometimes may yield arbitration remedies and
procedures that differ from those apparently specified by the contract.
70. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
71. The JAMS minimum standards for employment disputes provide that "[an em-
ployee's access to arbitration must not be precluded by the employee's inability to pay
any costs or by the location of the arbitration." JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note
5, Standard No. 6.
72. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SUPPLY OF IMPLICIT "ONE-SIDED" TERMS
The interaction between contract terms and provider rules and
practices may not always produce benefits for individual disputants.
As I have mentioned, in the context of my hypothetical dispute infor-
mation asymmetries may allow the employer to procure relatively un-
informed waivers of the employee's right to challenge the punitive
damages bar in court.7 3 The due process rules do not enable this re-
sult, but they do not prevent it either. In some contexts, moreover,
provider rules and practices may benefit their business customers
more directly. In effect, providers may supply "one-sided" terms that
cannot be detected from a review of the arbitration clause itself.
A. ARBITRATION PROVIDERS AS SUPPLIERS OF RISK MANAGEMENT
To see how this might be, return to the notion that there is a
highly segmented market for arbitration services.74 Providers differ-
entiate themselves in part by supplying varying degrees and kinds of
risk management. 75 As an example, consider the following data,
which I compiled from reports of arbitrations conducted in California
by both the NAF and JAMS. 76 The data show markedly different
worlds of arbitration.
7 7
2003-2006 CALIFORNIA ARBITRATIONS
78
Consumer as Consumer as
Provider Cases Claimant Respondent
JAMS 1241 98.7% 1.3%
NAF 27309 0.4% 99.6%
The NAF data reveal a provider whose business, at least in Cali-
fornia, consists almost exclusively of collections cases brought against
consumers by businesses in the consumer finance industry. This will
come as no surprise to many familiar with current arbitration de-
73. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
74. See supra page 663.
75. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
76. California law requires that arbitration providers file public reports containing
certain information about "consumer" arbitrations (defined broadly to include a variety
of dispute types, including employment disputes). See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96
(West Supp. 2007).
77. The reports are lengthy, in .pdf format, and omit a good deal of information.
Because I needed only rough counts, I compiled this data by running various searches,
rather than by hand-counting nearly 30,000 case entries. The data are sufficiently accu-
rate for my purposes, although I cannot guarantee that my counts are precise.
78. At the time this Essay went to press, the NAF had not published data for
fourth quarter 2006.
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bates.79 The JAMS data, by contrast, include few if any collections
cases; virtually all disputes involve consumer or employee claim-
ants.80 Moreover, the JAMS data reveal a much more diverse range of
business customers and dispute types.81
The prevalence of consumer finance industry collections cases
before the NAF might be explained by the NAF's relatively unique ar-
bitration product. Arguably, the NAF distinguishes itself by offering a
form of risk-management especially valued by the consumer finance
industry: class action protection.8 2 Unlike JAMS and the AAA, the
NAF has not promulgated rules for class arbitration.8 3 Indeed, it ap-
pears to market its rules as incompatible with class actions.8 4 This
offers several benefits for businesses that wish to avoid class actions
in general and class arbitration in particular. First, when the clause
does not expressly forbid classwide proceedings, NAF arbitrators may
interpret it to require individual arbitration.8 5 That decision will be
virtually immune from judicial review.8 6 Second, if the clause does for-
bid classwide proceedings, and a court invalidates the clause, the
79. Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, for example, has posted on its website discov-
ery material obtained from litigation involving First USA reporting that the bank had
been a party to over 51,000 NAF arbitrations, four of which had been filed by cardhold-
ers. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, McQuillan v. Check 'n Go of N.C., Inc., No. 04-CVS-
2858 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.tlpj.org/briefs-documents.
htm.
80. In the few arbitration demands filed with JAMS by businesses against individ-
ual consumers and employees, the individual often appears to be the real claimant. For
example, in several cases the consumer "respondent" is represented by the Beasley Al-
len law firm as part of a broader litigation in which Beasley Allen represents the
plaintiffs.
81. For example: 39.5% of the reported cases are categorized as "professional liabil-
ity/malpractice," many involving the Kaiser Permanente arbitration program adminis-
tered by JAMS. Another 22.4% are categorized as "business/commercial" disputes, and
disputes involving the consumer finance industry (as respondent) are a subset of this
category. Another 28.2% are categorized as employment disputes, and the remainder
are scattered among insurance, health care (non-malpractice), personal injury, real es-
tate, and construction disputes. By contrast, most of the NAF cases appear to involve
businesses in the consumer finance industry.
82. E.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Drafting and Implementing of a Con-
sumer Loan Arbitration Clause, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 295, 295 (1997) (noting the
possibility that arbitration will prevent class actions in the consumer financial services
industry); Letter from Curtis V. Brown, V.P. and General Counsel, National Arbitration
Forum, to prospective client (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file with author) (noting that arbitration
may eliminate class actions).
83. See JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2005), available at http://www.
jamsadr.com/rules/class-action.asp; AM. ARBITRATION AS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR
CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
84. See Letter from Curtis V. Brown to prospective client, supra note 81 (noting
that an arbitration clause may eliminate class actions).
85. Where there is doubt about the availability of class arbitration, Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), allocates this decision to the arbitrator.
86. E.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986).
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NAF's refusal to administer class arbitrations likely means that the
dispute will proceed as a class action in court.8 7 Alternatively, instead
of determining the validity of the class action waiver itself, a court
might refer that issue to an NAF arbitrator.8 8 NAF arbitrators may be
likely to uphold such terms, and these decisions should once again be
subject to limited judicial review.8 9 These are valuable benefits even
in collections cases. Indeed, lenders who engage in collections activity
in arbitration, especially before the NAF, may lower their risk of en-
countering statutory defenses to the debt or class actions filed as
counterclaims. 90
87. For examples of decisions invalidating arbitration agreements containing class
action waivers, see Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005);
Muhammad v. County Bank, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567
S.E.2d 265, 278-80 (W. Va. 2002); and Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1178-79 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
88. Arguably, the arbitrator should decide whether the class action waiver is en-
forceable. E.g., Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003).
89. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. IV 2004); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1999) (describ-
ing an arbitration agreement as "in effect, an agreement to comply with the arbitrator's
decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law").
90. It is not clear whether arbitration is cheaper for collections cases, for the lender
still must go to court to obtain an order confirming the award. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
Although these judicial proceedings can be perfunctory, they should require at least
formal service of process, e.g., REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 5, 7 U.L.A. 1, and pos-
sibly a hearing before a judge. (Unlike collections cases brought in court for a sum cer-
tain, this may be true even when the defendant fails to appear. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)
(clerk may enter default judgment for sum certain; "all other cases" left to the judge).
Local practice may vary, but I would view an order confirming an arbitration award as
akin to a declaratory judgment, and thus not suitable for a clerk-entered default judg-
ment.) That, plus the cost of arbitration, might make collections activity more expensive
in arbitration, at least in cases that involve no significant legal issues or discovery, and
also in cases where the lender anticipates a default judgment. But this assumes that
cases are processed individually, and arbitration may allow for bulk processing. For
example, on July 3, 2006, five NAF arbitrators issued awards in thirty-four collections
cases, apparently brought by four lenders. See http://www.arb-forum.com/rcontroldocu-
ments/FocusAreas/CAConsumerArbitrations2006Q3.pdf.
Other advantages of arbitration might be a higher rate of favorable awards and (a
related point) fewer statutory defenses raised by borrowers. The California data suggest
that almost half (45%) of the NAF collections cases were resolved without an appear-
ance by the borrower. Technically, the NAF rules do not provide for a default, e.g., NAT'L
ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE Rule 36 (2006), available at http://www.arb-
forum.com (follow "Rules & Forms" hyperlink), but merits hearings are likely to be per-
functory when the respondent is absent, and decisions may be made on paper submis-
sions. Id. Rule 25. Of course, default rates are likely to be high in collections cases
generally. E.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Progress: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 89, 97-98. Finally, the exis-
tence of collections cases in arbitration might be attributable, at least in part, to the
mutuality requirement sometimes imposed by courts. E.g., Showmethemoney Check
Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (Ark. 2000). But see Oblix, Inc. v.
Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2004).
As for the danger of encountering class action counterclaims in collections cases,
see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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B. PROVIDERS AS SUPPLIERS OF IMPLICIT "ONE-SIDED" TERMS
Although the NAF is something of a bate noire for consumer advo-
cates, 9 1 my point is not that its procedures are "unfair" for individu-
als. That may or may not be true. Instead, the NAF usefully
illustrates two broader points. First, some providers emphasize the
risk management component of their arbitration product. Second,
users may obtain some of these risk management benefits without in-
cluding "one-sided" terms in the contract itself. Thus, by selecting the
NAF, a business may purchase some degree of insulation from class
action risk whether or not it expressly addresses the topic of class ac-
tions in the arbitration clause.9 2 Of course, the business could attempt
to obtain more protection by expressly forbidding class actions, but
doing so might risk attracting increased judicial scrutiny.9 3
Indeed, any arbitration provider could implicitly supply one-sided
contract "terms" by fostering strong risk management practices
among its arbitrators. For example, a provider could facilitate the de-
velopment of implicit norms concerning, say, the propriety of arbitral
awards of punitive damages. Acting in accordance with such norms,
arbitrators might refuse to award punitive damages even in cases of
severe misconduct, or might award punitive damages in amounts too
small to serve any meaningful deterrent purpose. Such a practice
would amount to an implicit punitive damages waiver that cannot be
detected by reading the contract. As a result, apparently "even-
handed" arbitration clauses may, by virtue of their designation of a
particular arbitrator or provider, yield a "one-sided" process.
The historically private nature of arbitration may facilitate the
development of such practices by shielding them from public view. 94
Furthermore, to an extent, less scrupulous providers may free-ride on
other providers' efforts to enhance the public image of arbitration as
"fair."9 5 Thus, it should not surprise us if some providers differentiate
themselves by offering procedures that are subtly and not-so-subtly
biased in favor of their business customers.
91. E.g., Letter brief of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Mercuro v. Superior Court,
No. S105424 (Cal. Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://www.tlpj.org/briefsdocuments.
htm.
92. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
93. E.g., Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110; Muhammad, 912 A.2d 88; Dunlap, 567
S.E.2d at 278-80; Luna, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79. Depending on the jurisdiction, it
might even be preferable in some cases for the business to designate the NAF as pro-
vider, yet leave the agreement silent on the topic of class actions. If the arbitrator inter-
preted the agreement to require only individual arbitration, that decision should receive
substantial deference by a reviewing court. See supra notes 86 & 89.
94. E.g., Bales, 81 TuL. L. REV. at 365 (noting traditionally private nature of
arbitration).
95. E.g., Harding, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. at 372.
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Without further evidence, we cannot evaluate the extent to which
providers or individual arbitrators offer implicit one-sided "terms" to
the businesses that use their services. Recent efforts by some provid-
ers to increase the transparency of the arbitration process may shed
light on this question.9 6 More likely, providers who adopt more trans-
parent practices do so, in part, to enhance the legitimacy value of their
offerings and to further differentiate themselves in an already seg-
mented market for arbitration services. This suggests that courts
should view lack of transparency as a signal prompting further in-
quiry into the actual provider practices. Such an inquiry would follow
from the recognition that limits on arbitration remedies and proce-
dures need not be specified in the clause itself. Just as the due process
rules may sometimes produce an even-handed process from an appar-
ently one-sided clause, an apparently even-handed clause may some-
times obscure a one-sided disputing process.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has suggested that there may be an important and
poorly-understood interaction between arbitration clauses and the
rules and practices of arbitration providers and arbitrators. If true,
this realization has significant consequences for those interested in
arbitration clauses as contracts. Put simply, the clauses may paint an
incomplete or even misleading picture of actual arbitration procedures
and remedies.
For those interested in arbitration as a legal and social phenome-
non, the interaction I have described may be equally important. Arbi-
tration clauses are implemented in a relatively unique institutional
context, one in which third parties - arbitration providers and arbitra-
tors - may both constrain and abet efforts to impose a one-sided arbi-
tration process. It may be that we cannot understand arbitration
without exploring the relationship between these third parties and the
arbitration contracts that designate them.
96. See supra note 39.
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